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DONALD REGAN

C O M M E N T S ON P A R F I T

I will begin by saying that I am persuaded by most of Derek's claims
and arguments. That may tend to make for rather uninteresting
commentary, but I shall try to find something to say. I shall offer only
one criticism of the main part of Derek's paper, and then I shall
discuss at somewhat greater length the questions he raises in the last
section of his paper.
In the main body of the paper, Derek attempts to prove that if we
accept what he calls the Complex View of personal identity, then we
must abandon what he calls the Equal Concern Claim of Classical
Prudence. The basic argument is simple. On the Complex View,
personal identity is a matter of degree. But it is not irrational to think
that a fact which is a matter of degree is of lesser importance when it
holds to a lesser degree. Therefore, it is not irrational to think that
one's identity with oneself in the distant future may be of lesser
importance than one's identity with oneself in the near future. It
follows that it is not irrational to give greater weight to one's interests
in the near future. Classical Prudence is not a requirement of
rationality.
My only criticism of this argument may seem, and indeed may be,
niggling. Derek relies on the claim that on the Complex View identity is a
matter of degree. But is it, necessarily? The Complex View is defined
primarily by contrast to the Simple View. Derek also says that on the
Complex View, "the fact of personal identity over time just consists in
the holding of certain other facts," such as various kinds of psychological continuity. Now suppose someone says, "Personal identity
consists simply in continuity of physical and psychological development
nothing else. That is, we look at one person-at-a-time and another
person-at-a-different-time; if the person-at-the-later-time developed by
a continuous, non-disrupted process from the person-at-the-earliertime, then the two are in fact the same person." I shall call this view the
Developmental View. It seems to me that the Developmental View is a
Complex View, in Derek's terms, but a Complex View on which
personal identity is not a matter of degree.
-
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Derek overlooks the Developmental View because he tends to
equivocate, both when he uses the word "continuity" and when he
uses the word "connected," between two ideas that naturally go
together. One of these is roughly the idea of a development from one
state to another without "jumps"; and the other is the idea of
resemblance of the end points of the development. Resemblance of
the end points, which Derek concentrates on, is certainly a matter of
degree. But one could say that all that matters to personal identity is
development without jumps. Then one has the Developmental View,
and a Complex View on which personal identity is an all-or-nothing
matter.
Derek might protest that even continuity of development is a
matter of degree. What disrupts continuity of development? Well,
things like brain-washing, or extremely intrusive electric shock
therapy. These constitute "jumps" in development. But then, Derek
might observe, brain-washing and electric shock therapy come in
degrees. If identity depends on the absence o f jumps, and if the things
which can constitute jumps come in degrees, then identity will turn
out to be a matter of degree after all.
This is a good point, but not good enough. I concede that it makes
personal identity a matter of degree in some cases, for example, in the
cases of people subjected to brainwashing of "borderline" intensity
or disruptiveness. But the vast majority of people are not subjected to
brainwashing, or electric shock therapy, or anything else that a
proponent of the Developmental View would have to recognize as
potentially disrupting continuity of development, in any degree at all.
With respect to the vast majority of people, on the Developmental
View, no question of degree ever arises, and Derek has no argument
against the Equal Concern Claim. (I simply note, without explaining,
that what I am saying here is different, despite some superficial
similarity, from Derek's point that even on his view the reSemblances
of people to themselves over all actual lives are probably great
enough so that it would never be irrational to care equally about all
parts of one's future.)
Derek might now complain that the Developmental View is
extremely implausible. If we abandon the Simple View and look for
the fact of personal identity among "natural" facts, then surely
resemblance of the end points of development must count for something. On the issue of plausibility, I would agree. The Developmental
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View is implausible, and I suspect that anyone who held it would be
engaged in rationalization, trying to hold the Simple View in effect
without having to defend it. Still, the existence of the Developmental
View reveals a gap in Derek's logical argument.
Everything else I shall have to say is about the last section of
Derek's paper. If Classical Prudence is defeated - and despite my
carping I agree with Derek that it is - we are left with the issue of
how to justify a kind of criticism we are strongly disposed to make,
namely criticism of an agent for showing insufficient concern for his
own future interests. Derek suggests that if we cannot base our
criticism on an appeal to rationality, then morality must step in to fill
the gap. H e makes no attempt to conceal the fact that this suggestion
is in one respect highly counterintuitive. We are accustomed to think
of morality as imposing restrictions on an agent for the protection of
others. To the extent that we have traditionally recognized selfregarding moral duties, they have been duties of perfection - duties to
cultivate one's talents or to preserve one's purity, to use Derek's
examples. We have not generally thought of morality as the source of
a duty to look out for one's own general future happiness. But that is
what Derek proposes.
We could avoid this counter-intuitive aspect of Derek's appeal to
morality if we were willing to say that the agent's future selves are
"different persons" from the present agent. Then the appeal to
morality would be on behalf of " o t h e r s . " Derek does not take this
line. Indeed, there is a passage in his paper where it seems he is
taking particular care not to be trapped into it. After his discussion of
the propositions that not all relatives are equally close and that not all
pains are equally painful, there is a point at which it would be very
natural for him to say that not all of my interests are equally mine
(and specifically that my future interests are less mine than my
present interests). Derek refuses to say that my future interests are
less mine. One reason, I suspect, is that if he said my future interests
were not in the fullest sense mine, it would invite the question of
whose exactly they are. T h e y are ordinary, full-fledged, human interests. T h e y must be fully somebody's. If not mine, then whose? To
which the obvious answer would be that the interests in question
belong fully to my "future self" (or to one of my future selves),
regarded as somebody different from me.
Unlike Derek, I am inclined to take the view that my future selves
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are different persons from my present self. Admittedly, this view has
its own difficulties and its own counter-intuitive aspect. In ordinary
discourse, we speak as if one physical body is occupied by one
person throughout that body's physical life. We speak as if we have
no doubt that Donald Regan fifty years hence, if I live so long, will
still be m e . We certainly do not believe in general that a change in
something always constitutes a change in identity. We do not believe
that about ships or nations. Furthermore, if we take seriously the idea
that the agent in the future may be a different person from the person
he is at present, then we encounter severe problems about deciding
just exactly when he becomes another person. How do we separate
the time-extended agent into the different persons that he is over his
physical life?
Both Derek's suggestion and mine, then, are problematic. This is
not the place for a full-scale attempt to arbitrate between them. It
seems to me that Derek resists tampering with the normal extension
of "self" and "other," but that in consequence he is driven to deprive
the distinction between self and other of a good deal of its normal
moral force. In the long run, whether we prefer my view or Derek's
may depend on the extent to which our interest in personal identity is
motivated primarily by moral, as opposed to metaphysical, concerns.
In the short run, so long as we agree on cases, as Derek and I mostly
do, it may not matter too much what we say. (In the remainder of
these comments, I shall presuppose Derek's view that myself in the
future is still "me.")
All of this raises the question whether there is a way to analyze the
case of the agent who slights his own future interests which ought to
be preferred to both Derek's view and mine. Someone might say: "In
the case of an agent who slights his own future interests, there is no
basis for moral criticism because he hurts no one else. There is no
basis for an accusation of irrationality, as Derek has shown. Therefore, there is no basis for any criticism at all. If we have an impulse to
criticize, we should rather look to ourselves and suppress the impulse." (This argument depends on an implicit premise that if there is
no basis for saying the agent is either immoral or irrational then there
is no basis for criticism. This implicit premise is plainly Derek's, to
the extent he assumes morality must fill the space prudence vacates.)
The claim that there is no basis for criticism could be made somewhat
plausible, but I think it is ultimately indefensible. I shall not here
attempt either to build it up or to tear it down. I only note that the
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question presently at issue is not whether we should coerce people to
look out for their own future interests. It is only the question whether
there is a basis for criticism when people do not. The common view,
and Derek's view and mine, is that some sort of criticism is surely
appropriate.
Consider another possible reaction to Derek's argument: "Derek
has shown that if we accept the Complex View of personal identity,
then the person who slights his own future interests is not irrational.
He is also not immoral, since no one else is harmed. Therefore his
behavior is unexceptionable. But that is absurd. We know he is
behaving badly somehow. Obviously what Derek has given us is a
reductio ad absurdum of the Complex View." This reaction may
seem out of bounds. Derek does not purport to argue for the Complex
View in his paper. He takes it for granted, assuming that it can be
justified by arguments he does not here expound. However, the
reaction I have described is not entirely inappropriate. It reminds us
that we should not attempt to choose between the Simple View and
the Complex View of personal identity on metaphysical grounds
alone. One factor in the choice is the alternatives the two views allow
us for accounting for our "practical" (moral and prudential) intuitions. If the Complex View creates difficulties on this score which
the Simple View avoids, that counts against the Complex View
(without necessarily being decisive).
I just said, "If the Complex View creates difficulties on this score
which the Simple View avoids . . . . " That raises a question about the
Simple View which I hope will justify one paragraph of out-and-out
digression. Derek assumes, as most people do, that the Simple View
fits easily with Classical Prudence and the Equal Concern Claim; but
there is a difficulty even here. The Simple View naturally leads us to
think of the self as an entity somehow outside time. It is because the
self is essential]y timeless that it should be neutral among its temporally-distinct interests. Consider this however: If the self is essentially timeless, and if it is that timeless self that makes the choices
that are manifested in the temporal world, how could an agent
possibly fail to be temporally neutral? We assume that people
frequently fail to be temporally neutral, that people have an inclination to over-value their present interests. But the timeless self of
the Simple View could have no motive for such a time-preference. If
we truly believed in the Simple View, then should we not assume that
in any case where an agent appears to us to be temporally biased, the
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reason is that w e have misperceived the agent's true interests? (Of
course, even the timeless self might exhibit an apparent time-preference because of factual mistake, or uncertainty about the future, or
the like. I am concerned with apparent time-preference which remains
after such factors have been accounted for.) The tension I am
pointing out is not really between the Simple View and Classical
Prudence; it is between the Simple View and our impulse to c r i t i c i z e
some behavior as classically imprudent. If we believe not only in the
rightness of Classical Prudence, but also in the rightness of our
criticisms on the ground of imprudence, then there is some reason to
doubt that we can hold the Simple View after all. (I say "some
reason" because this paragraph obviously raises issues much too
complex for full discussion here.)
Let me now say just a few words about Derek's final question: If
the agent who slights his own future interests is thought to behave
immorally instead of imprudently or irrationally, does that strengthen
or weaken the case for paternalistic intervention? Intuitively, it seems
as if it might strengthen it, and I think we can produce a sort of an
argument to that effect. We have inclinations both to coerce shortsighted agents to behave prudently and to coerce selfish agents to
behave morally. But prudence and morality may conflict. In cases of
conflict, if we engage in coercion at all, we will compel the behavior
which is moral but imprudent. We are not at all inclined to compel the
behavior which is prudent but immoral. That suggests that morality is
in some relevant sense stronger than prudence, so that if we shift
from prudence to morality as the basis for protecting the agent's own
future interests, we are now appealing to a stronger basis for intervention.
I am not sure the argument just given is very helpful. The problem
is that it assumes niorality in its new role of protecting the agent's
future interests has the same force as morality in its old role of
protecting other agents. It is not at all clear, however, that morality in
its new role does have the same force. If we pose the question as one
of institutional design, then there are good reasons for treating
morality as not having the same force in its new role as in its old. One
of the standard objections to paternalism based on prudence and
rationality is that the paternalist is likely to make mistakes. The agent
is likely to know best about what will promote his own future
interests. That remains true whatever the ultimate normative basis of
our impulse to intervene. Similarly, the shift from prudence to moral-
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ity does not affect the fact that an agent seems more likely to look out
for his own future interests than to look out for the interests of
others.
I have suggested (and criticized) an argument that the shift from
prudence to morality strengthens the case for paternalistic intervention. Let me now suggest an argument for the opposite conclusion. There can be no objection at all, someone might say, to
interfering with a choice which is irrational. A choice which is
irrational simply cannot be the fully-deliberated choice of a fullycompetent agent. But it is only the fully-deliberated choices of
fully-competent agents that have an intrinsic moral value such that we
should refuse to interfere with them. An immoral choice, in contrast,
can be the fully-deliberated choice of a fully-competent agent. It is
unfortunate, but it is the case, that some agents just choose, in the
fullest possible sense of "choose," to act immorally. Still, these are
responsible choices. If the agent harms no one else by his immoral
choice (and when he harms only himself-in-the-future he harms no one
else, in Derek's view), we should not interfere. In sum, if Derek has
shown that the agent who slights his own future interests behaves
immorally but not irrationally, then he has shown that the intervention which we thought was justified in fact is not.
This argument, as it stands, is hardly more satisfying than my first
argument. It is suggestive, but every premise is highly controversial,
and some of the premises seem to beg the very question about the
strength of the justification for paternalism we are trying to answer.
The upshot is that I do not know how to answer Derek's final
question on principle. Perhaps we must simply go forward thinking
about the cases, designing institutions, and generally trying to see
how strong the reasons for paternalism (and against it) are, without
worrying too much at this stage about what difference it makes how
we characterize those reasons. Lest I be misunderstood, I should add
that I think the general tendency of Derek's argument is clearly to
strengthen the case for paternalism. I think the Complex View of
personal identity fits better than the Simple View with the idea that
we should sometimes intervene to protect an agent against himself.
It's just that for me Derek's final question is not the natural point of
entry into an explanation of why that is so.
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